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POST–WAR MIGRATION TRENDS IN THE BALTIC STATES

LUULE SAKKEUS

RU Series B No 20



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The present paper focuses to the differences among three Baltic states in their post–war migration pattern. On the basis of the current statistics through 1945–1991 the great impact of immigration from former Soviet Union to the Baltic states is shown, the latter forming to a great extent the basis for the current problems in the field of population, especially related to Estonia and Latvia. The main reason for the current problems must be seeked in the different timing of demographic transition in these two countries compared to the other parts of former Soviet Union. The data of 1989 All–Union census gives grounds to speak about the greatest share of foreign–born population in these two countries in the context of all Europe, the foreign– born population whose migrational, demographical, cultural, historical and ethnic behaviour considerably differs from that of the native population. Together with other heavy burdens inherited from the 50–years' Soviet rule, the needs of different sub–groups of the population only add to the current difficulties as in economic as well as in social aspects. In order to meet better the different needs of population more thorough investigations are needed for serving as a basis of any elaboration of social and population policy.

1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Mobility transition theory is important for understanding the general background of migration in and out of the Baltic States. The main principles of mobility transition theory were formulated by Wilbur Zelinsky [Zelinsky 1971]. According to this theory, the mobility transition proceeds simultaneously with the growth of the territorial mobility of population, especially during the phase of rapid fertility decline when the dependency between generations is weakening. The growth of territorial mobility is also supported by rapid population increase. Two main directions of population out–migration can be followed: to urban settlements in the native regions, and outside the traditional settlement area of the ethnic group.

Estonia and northern Latvia have been historically among the forerunners of the fertility transition in Europe. However, during the last half of this century, social conditions have been very different from those in Western countries [Katus 1982, 1991a; Zvidrinsh 1986].

The fertility transition took place later in the third Baltic country, Lithuania, with timing much closer to that of other East European countries [Stankuniene 1989]. In Lithuania social conditions also have been very different from those in the West.

Estonia began the mobility transition in the last quarter of the 19th century. The rural population started to decrease at the turn of the century [Maiste 1988]. In less than 60 years, the proportion of the population in urban places tripled – from 11.8 percent (1881) to 32.8 percent (1939). In Estonia, out–migration from the historic ethnic settlement areas was intensive. Most of the Estonian emigrants went to Russia, where the conditions for obtaining land were similar to or even better than those in the New World but migration with household belongings was much simpler than a voyage overseas. Russian official policy also favoured resettlement. By the end of the 19th century, Estonian settlements had sprung up in many regions, including the Russian Far East, Siberia, Abkhazia, the Crimea, and the lower reaches of the Volga River [Coquin 1969]. The greatest outflow from Estonia, however, took place to neighbouring areas: Pihkva (Pskov) and Vitebsk provinces and particularly the province and the city of St. Petersburg [Kulu 1992; Nigol 1918; Pullat 1981; Vôime 1975]. The number of the Estonians living outside the ethnic borders but within the Russian Empire can be estimated as approximately 200 thousand before World War I – about 15–17 per cent of total number of Estonians [Katus 1989].

Latvia has been characterized by similar processes. By the beginning of World War I, the urban population comprised 38 percent of the total population of Latvia [Vitolinsh, Matule 1986: 40]. At the beginning of the 20th century, Riga was the capital of the Baltic States in the Russian Empire and at that time had the third largest population after Moscow and St. Petersburg.

Data from the 1897 Russian Imperial census reveal differences in migration processes for the three Baltic States. Only about 1.3 percent of the total population of Lithuanians (together with Latgals), 4.7 percent of Latvians, and 10.3 percent of Estonians lived outside their state borders and in the territory of the Russian Empire. Between 1897 and

1926, the increase in the percentage of the population living in the borders of the Soviet Union but outside their ethnic territory was greatest for the Lithuanians (see Table 1).

By the beginning of World War II, Latvia and Estonia had fallen to below-replacement fertility. On the basis of Estonian data, it can be estimated that for both countries the intensity of migration had begun to decrease and stabilize [Katus and Sakkeus 1984].

The political events after the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement in 1939 not only had a political impact but also significantly affected the demographic development of the Baltic countries, especially Estonia and Latvia. One reason for the demographic impact was that Estonia and Latvia were at a much later stage of the demographic transition than the other parts of the USSR. The remainder of the USSR was at the stage of formation of intensive migration potential. Thus, the remainder of the USSR was a vast hinterland, with the Baltic States serving as attractive potential destinations for migrants [Vishnevsky et al. 1983].

Table 1

POPULATION OF LITHUANIANS, LATVIANS AND ESTONIANS
IN THE NATIVE COUNTRY AND SOVIET UNION (RUSSIAN EMPIRE (thousands)

Ethnicity	Lithuanians			Latvians			Estonians		
	1897	1926	1989	1897	1926	1989	1897	1926	1989
Total number	1659	2230	3067	1436	1868	1459	1003	1117	1113
Number in nativeland	1636	(1873)	2924	1368	(1480)	1388	899	970*	963
Number in SU	22.2	51.1	143	67.9	141.4	71	103.6	154.6	64
per cent	1.3	2.65	4.66	4.72	8.7	4.9	10.3	13.5	6.2
Number in rest of world (1985)			355			100			86

Sources:[Narodnost..., 1927, s. 24-25; Bromlei 1988; Natsionalnyi... 1991; Tooms 1927; Kulu 1992]
* by 1922 census;
( ) = estimation.

The later timing of the demographic transition in Lithuania has to a great extent determined the development of its migration processes. In Lithuania, the rural population started to decrease after World War II. This decrease intensified in the 1970s. The rural population, rather than immigration from outside of Lithuania, was the main source of growth of the urban population of Lithuania during the whole post-war period [Sipaviciene 1989, 1990]. Hence, during the period of maximum immigration of Slavic nationalities into the Baltic in the 1960s and 1970s, rural-urban migration in Lithuania

was a larger contributor to urban growth than immigration [Vishnevsky and Zayonchkovskaya 1992].

By 1945 (after the repatriation of Germans and the rearrangement of borders, the latter concerning mostly Estonia), Estonians formed more than 97 per cent of the population of Estonia. The titular nationalities in the other two Baltic States comprised about 80 percent. The share of non-titular nationalities is currently the greatest in Latvia. According to the 1989 census, 52 percent of the total population were Latvians; while the share of Estonians in Estonia was about 60 percent; and Lithuanians in Lithuania about 80 percent. However, the impact of post-war immigration can be evaluated most readily for Estonia.

The largest ethnic group apart from the group native to the area in all the Baltic States is the Russians. With annexation by the USSR and the change in borders, Estonia lost practically all of its ethnic Russians (which, according to the 1934 census, had been 8 percent), since most Russians in Estonia lived in regions that became part of Russia. That was not the case with Latvia. According to the 1935 census, 8.8 percent of the population of Latvia were Russians. However, Russians in Latvia did not tend to live in regions of Latvia that became part of Russia. The second and third largest ethnic groups in Latvia are Ukrainians and Byelorussians. Almost no Ukrainians or Byelorussians lived in Estonia before World War II. In Latvia, Byelorussians were the fourth largest ethnic minority. In Lithuania, Byelorussians were the third largest minority after Jews and Poles. According to the 1931 census, Lithuanians comprised 84 percent, Russians and Byelorussians 2.5 percent.

The Slavic ethnic groups that came to form large minorities in the Baltic States were at the stage of the demographic transition in which their migration potential was increasing rapidly. This phase of the demographic development of the Slavic ethnic groups, along with particular characteristics of the Baltic States, led members of Slavic groups to fill openings in the labour pool in the Baltic States. Characteristics of the Baltic States that contributed to Slavic immigration include the more developed infrastructure, extensive development of the economy, the deportation and emigration of large numbers of the native population, and high labour-force participation rates. This happened first in Estonia and Latvia. In contrast, Lithuania, which was at a similar stage with the European part of Russia, Ukraine and Byelorussia in its demographic behaviour, experienced the impact only of the first post-war forced administrative immigration of Slavs.

Lithuania differs in the development of migration processes from the other two Baltic States. At the time of its annexation by the Soviet Union, Lithuania had just entered the stage of labour export and could meet its needs for extensive economic development with its own population resources.

Estonia and Latvia experienced migration trends that were very close to contemporary trends in Europe. Until the end of the demographic transition, both countries were labour-exporting regions. The geopolitical revolution in the beginning of the 1940s and the annexation by the Soviet Union led to high immigration from the Soviet hinterland to Estonia and Latvia. Estonia and Latvia were characterized by high labour-force participation rates, especially among women [Puur 1989; 1992]. With a well-developed economic and communications infrastructure, these countries were a low-cost setting for

development of branches of all-union economic ministries. People from the near-hinterland regions which had historical contacts with the region were the first to migrate. In the 1960s, when the labor potential started to decline in the near hinterland, the hinterland for supplying the human resources needed to maintain the highly developed economies of the Baltic began to enlarge [Katus and Kümmel 1989; Sakkeus 1991a]. This resulted in a great turnover of migrants as well as the involvement of people from regions who had never had historical, social, or cultural contacts with the Baltic region.

The Soviet economy needed a large number of low-skilled workers to maintain high production. This was due to an excess of working-age population and the lack of development of technology-consuming branches. This was especially true in Estonia and Latvia, where most migrants worked in all-union enterprises in heavy industry or construction. This migration pattern led to an enormous share of the foreign-born population in Estonia and Latvia consisting of members of ethnic groups with a very different social, historical and cultural background and demographic development from the titular nationalities. Although the immigrant-based population had few roots in the Baltic states, many also lost any connection with their home region.

The restructuring of economics in the newly independent Baltic States first affected the all-union based industries, which had little connection with the local economics. The former employees of these all-union enterprises often lost work, and thus a contingent of people who had immigrated from the East (and their descendants) were put into economic limbo. This is the main population category that should be of concern for migration policy, both in the Baltic States and in Western countries.

Below I shall pay most attention to the main trends of migration between the Baltic States and the former USSR that created the current situation in these states. The Soviet Union - Baltic States migration exchange could be treated as part of East-West migration. In the Soviet Union, the Baltic States were often referred to as the "Soviet West" and there is some basis for this characterization.

2. IMPACT OF POST-WAR DEVELOPMENT ON THE CURRENT SITUATION IN THE BALTIC STATES' MIGRATION PATTERN.

Usually the impact of the post-war immigration into Estonia and Latvia and its impact on the current population are underestimated. Of the three Baltic states, immigration has been the greatest into Estonia. There are many other differences between the three Baltic countries in this respect. The basic reason for underestimation of the impact of immigration in Estonia, as well as in the other Baltic countries, is the lack of availability of appropriate data. Even the absolute numbers of migrants in and out of the Baltic States were closed from publication during the Soviet period. Moreover, for the 1940s and 1950s, only incomplete migration statistics exist. However, these are precisely the decades of organized immigration for political reasons, strenghtened by deportation of a large number of members of the native population to Siberia. It is therefore difficult to obtain a complete picture of immigration into the Baltic States if one relies only on data on registered moves.

2.1 Deportations

The magnitude of deportations differed in the three Baltic States. In Lithuania, some estimates show that 10–12 percent (230–270 thousand) of Lithuanians were deported, while repatriation and emigration involved another 250 thousand (320 thousand) [Damushis 1988; Truska 1988]. In Latvia, deportation and the terror of the first years of the Soviet regime involved about 205 thousand people (10–11 percent of Latvians) [260 thousand according to Zvidrinsh and Reuderink 1992], repatriation and forced emigration to Germany involved another 100 thousand, and about 100 thousand emigrated to other Western countries [Latvia Today 1991: 6]. In Estonia, population loss between 1940 and the 1941 census was 104 thousand persons, which includes: (1) repatriation of Germans (13,339 [Raid 1978]); (2) first deportations of 1941 and; (3) those who were forced to evacuate into other regions of the Soviet Union in the beginning of the war (loss in first 3 months of Soviet period 99,500, i.e., deportations and evacuation). Emigration to the West was the greatest in 1944 and has been estimated at approximately 70 thousand people [Reinans 1985]. The population of Estonia had been reduced by 1945 by about 207,100 persons or 18.5 percent [Kaufmann 1967: 111–113]. According to estimates by Kalev Katus [1989], about 32 thousand of them may have returned afterwards. The second wave of deportations in 1949 involved approximately 53–57 thousand [Niinemets 1989], which, not taking into account the unknown number who disappeared during the war, makes the losses of Estonian population due to direct Soviet terror to be around 12–17 percent [Parming 1972].

Figure 1 shows the level of immigration into the three Baltic States compared to the level at the first date. The figures refer to the urban population, because the migration of rural population in the Soviet Union was not registered until 1956. It can be seen that all three countries were subject to intensive immigration from the rest of the Soviet Union, especially in the immediate post–war years (1945–1950). In Latvia and Estonia, another peak followed in the early fifties – in Estonia in two sharp waves, in Latvia a bit smoother. The level remained noticeably lower in Lithuania. Comparison of the contribution of external migration to total immigration in Estonia and Lithuania for 1955–1980. Figure 2 indicates the lower share of immigration from elsewhere in the Soviet Union into Lithuania.

The level of immigration has decreased since the late 1950s due to the release of local migration potential and the diminished importance of administratively supervised migration. In Estonia, after intensive immigration during the first post–war decade, the share of external immigration, although lower, remained at a stable high level. For Estonia, the absolute number of in– and out–migrants can be reconstituted more accurately for the whole post–war period. Figure 3, shows total migration for Estonia, as an illustration.

2.2. Migration exchange with USSR

The large number of immigrants in the two first years after the war and the next peak in the early 1950s, after the second deportation of the native population to Siberia, can be noticed (Figure 3). At the end of the 1950s, the importance of administative migration was reduced, and the survivors from the deportation had a chance to return. Migration

flows between Estonia/Latvia and the rest of the USSR were gradually assuming the expected pattern, given their distinctive migration potentials.

In the 1960s, the migration potential in one Slavic region after another began to decrease, which resulted *inter alia* in a decreasing immigration flow into Baltic States from these regions. Beginning at the end of the 1960s, an enormous increase in the proportion of migrants from the outer hinterland occurred [Katus, Sakkeus 1984]. However, the total rate of influx of migrants to Estonia and Latvia decreased, with much slower speed than the inflow from the previous hinterland. Figure 4 demonstrates the continuously high net gain from migration between the USSR and Estonia in the 1970s and 1980s, even while there was a tenfold decrease in migration from the nearest hinterland (for example, flows between the neighbouring Pihkva oblast and Estonia).

Latvia has been characterized by a similar immigration rate throughout the period, showing the last exertions to maintain a high level just before the total collapse of the totalitarian system. Figure 4 clearly illustrates the different path of Lithuania's development.

The high intensity of migration processes accounts for the lack of adaptation of the immigrants to their new location. In the period 1956–1991 (when the registration of moves had been extended also to the rural population), the total number of migrations in Estonia (turnover) was about seven times higher than the number of net migrants (1400 and 200 thousand, correspondingly, turnover comprising an amount equal to the total number of Estonian population). The same situation has been characteristic of Latvia and Lithuania (in the period 1960–1991, turnover was higher by 6.2 and 6.8 times, respectively). Still, the effects of the immigration were much greater for Estonia than for the other two Baltic States. For example, the number of ethnic Russians in Estonia was more than 20 times higher in 1989 than in 1945 (475 thousand to 23 thousand), whereas in Latvia it was a little more than 6 times (906 thousand to 147 thousand).

In Estonia, migration intensity in different cohorts towards the USSR can be followed through 25 years (Figure 5). First of all, attention should be paid to the high intensity of internal migration. Because internal migration involved mainly Estonians, the pattern should describe the migration behaviour of the native population. According to the 1979 and 1989 all–union censuses, the share of the migrant population in the total population was the greatest in Estonia of the three Baltic States and equally high among urban and rural populations. It can be assumed that this has been mostly achieved through higher internal migration intensity. The decrease of the latter in the last years could represent the initial slow–down characteristic of the stage of the onset of mobility development [Bengtsson and Johansson 1992].

In contrast to internal migration, older cohorts (20–25 and 25–29 years–old) show the greatest migration intensity in the Soviet Union, which reflects the predominance of job–oriented movements in the stream. According to a comparison of internal and external age–specific out–migration rates of Estonia [Sakkeus 1991b], the differences were greater for women than for men. Estonian female migration intensity has been greater than male mostly because of education–related movements. For movements into regions of the USSR, males predominate. The curves exhibit the traditional gender crossover in the late teens, which is not the case for internal migration in Estonia. The big difference between the cohorts of 15–19 and 20–24 years–old in external migrations is mostly due

to movements in relation to military service, which are included in this stream. It must be underlined that in all of the USSR-oriented streams, the native population has had a very low involvement; almost all of these migrants are members of the Slavic nationalities. Internal movements have mostly involved the native populations; so the age rates in this case are depicting also differentiated mobility behaviour by nationality.

The 1989 age-specific out-migration rates in Latvia and Lithuania, compared to the level in Estonia (Figure 6), reveal greater migration intensity in Estonia in the younger and the economically active ages. In contrast, in the ages around the retirement period, Latvia's and Lithuania's migration intensity is almost twice as high as Estonia's. Common to all the movements in the former USSR is a noticeable upward slope for retirement-age mobility. On the one hand, this reflects Soviet housing policy, in which it was better to declare one more person living with the household in order to improve the younger families' living conditions; on the other hand, it also means that the real retirement age is older (according to Puur [1991], the difference between the real and legal pensionable age is about 5 years), and people tend to move at older ages.

The data on migration exchange with the rest of the USSR, with its high turnover, suggest the utility of a more thorough examination of the foreign-born populations of the three Baltic States.

2.3. Foreign-born population.

The number of foreign-born population in Estonia is 411 thousand, which comprises 26.3 percent of the total population. Among them are 42.6 thousand foreign-born Estonians, mostly descendants of out-migrants from the mobility transition period; however, they comprise only 4.4 percent of the Estonians. In contrast, the share of foreign-borns among the non-Estonians is as high as 61.2 percent. Leaving aside Liechtenstein, Monaco, and other tiny countries, only Luxembourg demonstrates a higher share of foreign-born population in Europe (Figure 7) [Recent... 1990]. Typically, the European countries have less than 10 percent of foreign-borns in their total population. The three-times higher proportion of foreign-born population in Estonia has strengthened all the well-known social problems connected with the immigrants.

Latvia is close to Estonia in the prportion of the total population that is foreign born. However, the proportion of the population of Lithuania that is foreign born is less than half the proportion in Estonia and Latvia (Table 2). Unlike Estonia and Latvia, Lithuania is similar to Western Europe in the proportion of the population that is foreign born.

Table 2

SHARE OF FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION,
BALTIC STATES, 1989

	ESTONIA		
	TOTAL	FOREIGN-BORN	%
TITULAR NATION	963281	42561	4.01
RUSSIANS	474834	271020	57.08
UKRAINIANS	48271	38092	78.91
BELORUSSIANS	27711	21840	78.81
JEWS	4613	3062	66.38
POLES	3008	2193	72.91
NON-TITULAR ALL	602381	368516	61.18
TOTAL	1565662	411077	26.26
	LATVIA		
	TOTAL	FOREIGN-BORN	%
TITULAR NATION	1387757	41035	2.96
RUSSIANS	905515	409068	45.18
UKRAINIANS	92101	74265	80.63
BELORUSSIANS	119702	82185	68.66
JEWS	22897	10755	46.97
POLES	60416	20662	34.20
NON-TITULAR ALL	1278810	648279	50.69
TOTAL	2666567	689314	25.85
	LITHUANIA		
	TOTAL	FOREIGN-BORN	%
TITULAR NATION	2924231	64430	2.20
RUSSIANS	344455	172430	50.06
UKRAINIANS	44789	35325	78.87
BELORUSSIANS	63169	46186	73.11
JEWS	12392	5415	43.70
POLES	257994	32964	12.78
NON-TITULAR ALL	750571	311333	41.48
TOTAL	3674802	375763	10.23

The foreign-born population is also characterized by a very uneven territorial distribution. Most of the immigrants have settled in the cities. Figure 8 indicates that more than 90 percent of the foreign-born population is concentrated in urban areas. As a result, some of the cities (mainly those which served as Soviet military bases, such as Paldiski and Sillamäe in Estonia; Daugavpils in Latvia; Snechkus in Lithuania) have become totally immigrant, where the native population accounts for less than 10 percent.

At the level of the settlement system, a two-wave urbanization was introduced: at the turn of the century, all urban areas grew in size as parts of the local settlement hierarchy, while some of them grew because of immigration from the rest of the USSR after the annexation of the Baltic States. Toomas Kümmel has demonstrated the destabilization of the Estonian settlement system as a whole and the formation of its colonial nature as a result of the second wave of urbanization [Kümmel 1986]. Figure 8 demonstrates the high proportion living in urban places among all the non-titular nationalities and the similar high level of urban residence among foreign-borns. It could also be regarded as a principally different behaviour among the ethnic groups forming the main part of the foreign-borns in the Baltic States.

There are great differences in the share of the foreign-born population in different ethnic groups (Table 2). In all of these states, the highest share of foreign-borns is found among Byelorussians and Ukrainians; a much lower share is found among Russians. In Latvia, Russians form a major part of the native-borns and of those in the second generation. In Estonia and Lithuania, the lower share of foreign-born population among Russians compared to the other Slavic nationalities reflects the earlier mobility transition among Russians, who were the first Slavic group to migrate into the Baltics; their second generation forms the current Russian native-borns in these two countries.

Among the 120 ethnic groups comprising Estonia's foreign-born population, ten ethnic groups form about 98 percent, among whom the greatest share belongs to the Russians with over 65 percent, and Slavic groups together comprise more than 80 percent. With the extension of the hinterland, later Russian arrivals came from regions with totally different social and cultural backgrounds than the near hinterland migrants. This added to the nonadaptive nature of the migrant population. Judging from the out-migration streams, it seems that the nonadaptive migrants are remaining on the move.

In the Estonian case, the non-Estonian population is overwhelmingly foreign-born among most of the 120 ethnic groups. As revealed in Table 2, it is not so characteristic of the other two Baltic states. In this context, it should be recalled that during the political turnover of the 1940s and following World War II, Estonia lost practically all of its ethnic minorities and became a monoethnic country. Sixty-one percent of the non-Estonians are foreign-born, and comprise the major population category for potential future emigration. Using Estonia as an example, the main differences between the foreign-born and the native populations are elucidated.

The share of foreign-borns in the total population of Estonia is the highest in the age-group 50-59 and gradually decreases in younger ages. For ages above 45 the share of the foreign-born population nearly coincides with the share non-Estonians. This is not surprising, becauses Estonia was ethnically homogeneous just after the war and the number of native-born non-Estonians was accordingly very low. Correspondingly, the share of Estonians and native-borns also coincides for the ages above 45. Figure 9 presents the cumulative share of foreign-born population among all non-Estonians. For persons above age 40, the foreign-born population comprises more than 90 percent; even for the population older than 20, their share is nearly 80 percent.

In the analysis of the differences between the native- and foreign-born population of Estonia [Katus and Sakkeus 1992], the comparison of educational levels yields interesting results. According to Figure 10, the non-Estonians were less likely to stay at

a low educational level than Estonians. However, this unexpected outcome might be due to differences in the definitions of educational levels between the Soviet Union and Estonia. Throughout the former Soviet Union a person could acquire secondary education by age 16, whereas in Estonian-language schools in Estonia, students might have only begun secondary school at that age. This could also explain why the trends for native- and foreign-born non-Estonians nearly coincide. In Estonia, Russian-language schools followed all-union instructions. This meant it was easier to complete secondary education in Russian-langauge schools than in Estonian-language schools.

One of the indicators of adaptation is knowledge of the language of the area in which people reside, assuming that foreign-born people have intentionally linked themselves to the territory (Figure 11). In this respect, an enormous difference exists between the native- and foreign-born non-Estonians. Knowledge of Estonian language is clearly higher among native-borns. This differential decreases at the younger ages. One might think that due to interaction at school or on playgrounds, children would more easily pick up the commonly spoken language. That the outcome is opposite to initial expectations demonstrates the impact of the second generation of the non-Estonian foreign-born population: although born in Estonia, little adaptation has occurred. There is also no difference in knowledge of the second language among foreign-born non-Estonians by age. It stays low for all age groups and does not exceed 20 percent.

On the basis of the outlined differences, the conclusion is reached that the second generation of the post-war immigrants follows the demographic behavioural pattern of their parental home regions rather than the region they are residing in.

In the absence of direct information about the permanent and migrant population, some researchers, especially recently, have used ethnicity to divide the population by origin. The information on ethnicity has been used in Soviet statistics more frequently than other possible indicators of origin.

Using this simple division of the whole population, it has been shown that demographically the population of Estonia, in particular, and to some extent Latvia, has split into two behavioural patterns: one typical of permanent residents (Estonians by the defining criterion), the other typical of immigrants (non-Estonians). The two subpopulations are differentiated by most if not by all demographic processes [Katus, Puur 1990; Sakkeus 1991b; Vikat 1991]. Differentiation was caused less by ethnic origin than by historically different demographic development related to the group's cultural background. The coexistence of the two behaviour types must also be taken into consideration when dealing with social processes in a wider context [Anderson, Silver, Titma 1991; Mihhailov 1990; Paadam 1990; Pavelson 1992].

In the following it is shown that Baltic States' migration exchange with the Western countries also became dependent on the history of migration between the Baltic States and Russia. The future direction of the Baltic States' migration becomes even more dependent on the ethnic groups' capacity for movements formed by the proportion of foreign-borns in their populations.

2.4 Migration exchange with Western countries

During the Soviet era, there was extremely little migration between the USSR and the other countries of the world (referred to here as "West"). International migration constitutes an extremely small share in external migration for the Baltic States. For the period 1959–1991, the crude out–migration rates of the Baltic States to Western countries are shown in Figure 12. Latvia and Estonia are very different from Lithuania in the 1970s. In Estonia, the out–migration rate in the middle of 1970s overwhelms even the second wave of the second half of 1980s. The last peak has been common to the whole Soviet Union. But unlike the other regions of the previous USSR, each Baltic State shows an increase in the intensity of out–migration over the borders of the previous Soviet Union. This increase occurred first in Estonia in 1987, followed by a steep decrease in subsequent years. The increase occurred next in Latvia and then in Lithuania.

The immigration stream from the West has been constantly low, although showing some increase through the period. The last peak of the second half of 1980s is due to the initial social and political changes in the USSR which encouraged people to return to the USSR who had previously left.

The sources of the peak of 1970s emigration for Latvia and Estonia and its non–occurence in Lithuania, should be sought in the migration exchange of these two Baltic countries with the rest of the Soviet Union. The suggestion was made earlier that during the Soviet period, Estonia has been used by members of some ethnic groups as a transit point on the way to Western countries [Sakkeus 1991]. For example, in the immigration from other regions of Soviet Union into Estonia (especially from Kazakhstan, which earlier had practically no migration relations with Estonia) a sudden increase of Germans could be traced to the beginning of the 1970s, in the Estonian case the same applies for Poles as well as Jews. This explanation is also likely to account for the pattern in Latvia.

The analysis of the ten main ethnic groups in Estonia [Katus 1991b] reveals some interesting facts that indirectly help to understand the composition of migration to the West. For example, by the 1959 census only 670 Germans were living in Estonia, while by the 1970 census their number had increased about 10 times. The distribution by first language is interesting. Out of all Germans, 36 percent claim German as first language, 56.5 percent claim Russian. The Jews previously living in Estonia had practically vanished by the end of World War II. According to the 1989 census their number is comparable to the pre–war one, but if analyzed by first language (mother tongue), then one finds that 12.3 percent claim the mother tongue of their group (Yiddish) and 78.3 claim Russian. Approximately the same is true for the Poles: 20 percent claim Polish as first language, 63.4 claim Russian. The data in Table 2 presenting the share of the foreign–born population among the above–mentioned ethnic groups show even more clearly the role of immigration from the East in Estonia.

Crude emigration rates in Estonia by ethnic group for 1989 are the highest for Poles (170 per thousand), Germans (90.6 per thousand) and Jews (63.95 per thousand). The rates for Ukrainians, Byelorussians and Russians are much lower (CMR ranging from 2.3 to 1.04 per thousand) and the rates for Finns and Estonians are even lower. Data for Lithuania reveals a similar trend: particular ethnic groupd dominate emigration to West (CMR for Jews 94.3 per thousand). Approximately 90 percent of Poles are native–born.

Emigration rates for Poles are comparable with Lithuanians and both groups have very low rates (0.53 and 0.09 per thousand). The non-Polish Slavic ethnic groups are primarily foreign-born. These groups show a greater intensity to emigrate than native-borns and, among them, Ukrainians are distinguished with a rate of 3.2 per thousand.

Another special feature of the Baltic region has been their intermediate role in migration between the rest of the Soviet Union and Western countries. For those army officers and soldiers who had served in allied Eastern European countries, the Baltics have served as the main region for return, partly because it had relatively high living standards. Table 3 gives the main origin and destination countries for migration with Estonia. Mongolia and Afghanistan, as well as Germany (and other ex-socialist countries), are examples of immigration regions for former military personnel to Estonia until 1989. Immigration from Finland in 1985-1986 and from Poland 1988-1989 are the result of work contracts with these countries - people from these two countries came into Estonia as skilled construction workers.

The years 1989-1991 show the decreasing importance of Israel and Poland as emigration destinations. Germany remained at a level similar to previous years, while new destinations gained in importance. Sweden, Finland, the USA and Canada became more important as emigration destinations for Estonia. For instance, in Lithuania, besides the traditional emigration to Israel, Poland and Germany, USA and Australia gained in importance. In some aspects Latvia differs from its neighbours. Many Latvian communities have sprung up in America and Australia, but there are very few in Europe [Bromlei 1988].

Table 3

EMIGRATION FROM ESTONIA BY COUNTRY OF DESTINATION, 1984-1991

	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991
BULGARIA	2	4	3	4	0	5	2	3
AFGHANISTAN	4	4	2	4	1	0	0	0
ISRAEL	1	4	0	100	878	782	522	369
USA	3	6	4	7	42	77	27	272
CANADA	4	3	7	7	43	22	14	16
SWEDEN	2	5	5	44	44	42	27	46
FINLAND	29	386	535	134	173	69	140	289
HUNGARY	46	36	22	17	22	4	5	5
CZECHOSLOVAK	73	16	30	21	30	13	4	1
POLAND	76	60	51	70	399	553	313	148
MONGOLIA	89	100	44	39	37	3	1	0
GERMANY	314	279	227	472	497	694	544	499
OTHER	47	35	67	467	283	101	68	50
TOTAL	690	938	997	1386	2449	2365	1667	1698

IMMIGRATION TO ESTONIA BY COUNTRY OF DEPARTURE, 1984-1991								
	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991
BULGARIA	2	5	0	1	2	3	5	3
AFGHANISTAN	4	20	12	25	44	27	9	3
ISRAEL	0	0	0	0	0	4	13	10
USA	1	0	2	1	2	1	4	5
CANADA	3	2	0	0	1	1	1	3
SWEDEN	0	0	1	2	3	0	2	3
FINLAND	1	1185	333	85	6	11	11	6
HUNGARY	36	63	61	68	29	38	22	10
CZECHOSLOVAK	45	67	47	54	41	41	46	23
POLAND	69	85	67	145	888	681	342	32
MONGOLIA	103	146	86	92	72	90	71	22
GERMANY	365	398	319	304	288	436	217	103
OTHER	59	60	184	52	232	47	84	14
TOTAL	688	2031	1112	829	1608	1380	827	237

However, Western countries altogether form only the fourth-ranked region for the Baltic States' migration exchange. From Table 4, the distribution of the main immigration and emigration regions can be followed. The main emigration regions for the Baltic States remain neighbouring countries in the East. The emigration rates have been quite stable so far. Preliminary data for Estonia show that 1992 is going to be a turning point in emigration to East. Its volume has approximately tripled in Estonia, totalling about 30,000 emigrants, whereas emigration to Western countries has stayed on the level of previous years or even decreased. The same is true of Latvia. In the first six months of 1992, about 20,000 persons emigrated to the East, half of whom went to Russia. Lithuania in this case, with its much lower share of foreign-born population, would not be expected to show such an increase towards the East.

Table 4

DISTRIBUTION OF IMMIGRATION TO BALTIC STATES BY REGION OF DEPARTURE, 1990 (percent)			
	ESTONIA	LATVIA	LITHUANIA
RUSSIA	63.4292	71.7855	53.8364
UKRAINE	11.1085	9.3023	12.6398
BELORUSSIA	3.2812	2.7869	7.2700
CENTRAL ASIA	3.5557	3.5364	4.7204
CAUCASUS	2.6846	2.1910	2.4714
BALTIC STATES AND MOLDOVA	6.0733	5.8428	8.5448
OTHER	9.8676	4.5551	10.5171
	100	100	100

DISTRIBUTION OF EMIGRATION FROM BALTIC STATES BY REGIONS OF DESTINATION, 1990 (percent)

	ESTONIA	LATVIA	LITHUANIA
RUSSIA	59.2969	45.6981	42.6488
UKRAINE	14.5541	13.6518	15.9049
BELORUSSIA	4.8541	15.7201	10.4205
CENTRAL ASIA	2.3222	2.8482	5.2895
CAUCASUS	1.8384	0.8731	1.8932
BALTIC STATES AND MOLDOVA	3.6930	5.2513	6.5245
OTHER	13.4414	15.9575	17.3187
	100	100	100

2.5 Data collection

The above overview is based on registration statistics, which do not cover all movements. The Soviet register-based statistics do not take into account temporary migration such as temporary residence changes, temporary work, and tourism. The system is especially incomplete in areas with a lot of private housing. Official statistics show more than a 20 percent decrease in internal migration. It is certain that this is partially due to incomplete recording of data, although there may be some decline in the actual magnitude of internal movements. The decline in the recorded level of internal movement is greater in Estonia than in the other Baltic countries. In the other two countries, the initial decrease of internal migration due to the disappearance of factors induced by restrictions of the Soviet system has shown some stabilization.

One of the main social problems resulting from migration changes is growth of the illegal population. A prognosis made by the Estonian Interuniversity Population Research Centre based on the births of non-resident parents and deaths of people not registered as residing in Estonia for 1991 gave a total of 45-50 thousand illegal residents. There is a similar problem in Latvia and Lithuania. This brings us to the principles of migration policy in the Baltic States and other countries.

Estonia is currently in transition towards human-centered social organization. Unfortunately, in the transition process, migration data recorded during the last two years suffer from an extreme undercount. The recording of migration statistics was so poor by the end of 1992 that it is not possible after 1991 to estimate even the total population of Estonia, based on the registered data. Probably there are similar problems with recent data in the other Baltic States. Cooperation in this field with Western countries may help in the development of a better data recording system.

2.6. Migration policy

So far, there is no systematic plan for migration policy in the Baltic States. The first reaction of policy-makers in the Baltic States was to restrict immigration from the East. In Estonia in 1990, an Immigration Law was introduced. This law failed to make clear the population being targeted, and the quota for immigration was not enforced. The existence of this new law also had an impact on out-migration; people who had come for a short-term stay were in these conditions reluctant to leave. Latvia was the next to implement an immigration law. The Latvian and Lithuanian laws on immigration have mainly tried to control immigration by charging high fees for entry, and none of them has concentrated on the mechanisms causing people to wish to move into or out of a state [Stankuniene and Sipaviciene 1989].

Lithuania has less to be concerned about in its migration policy than Estonia or Latvia, because Lithuania had a much smaller immigration from the East. By the end of 1992, Lithuania had formulated its laws about citizenship, immigration and emigration, and alien status. Estonia was slower to formulate policy in these areas. Only at the end of 1992 did policy-makers begin to think about defining alien status in Estonia, even though new Russian passports were to be issued beginning January 1, 1993. In short, migration policy in the Baltic states for the most part follows political processes and reflects the over-politicized attitude of the society toward migration processes [Sipaviciene 1992].

On the other hand, Russia itself is also lagging behind in the formulation of its attitude towards citizenship of those 18 percent of Russians residing in the newly independent republics of the former Soviet Union. The conference "New Russian Abroad: Problems, Perspectives" [Maslov and Osinski 1992] brought out that Russians were waiting for their motherland to recognize its citizens in these different regions where there is no basis for applying for refugee status. In particular, the representatives of the Russian communities from the Baltic States and Ukraine called for the Russian government to develop Russian-language based education and culture in these states for persons who were citizens of Russia. So far, governmental agreements have not dealt with policies for their citizens residing in other countries. Only recently, first drafts dealing with the possible conditions of return migrants have started to be worked out in governmental offices. In every state non-governmental organizations have sprung up who are trying to help in solving the reemigration problem for Russians, in the absence of governmental action. No work on agreements about reemigration with Ukraine and Byelorussia has yet occurred.

In Lithuania, some illegal migrants have come from Pakistan, Turkey, and other places [Sipaviciene 1992]. Also, Estonia had a problem with Romanians trying to apply for refugee-based entry visas to Finland, and Somalians who landed in Finland through Estonia. Quite recently, a problem with Iraqi Kurds has arisen, and some Lebanese have tried to enter without valid visas or passports. It should be expected that this tendency is going to increase since there is no law defining criteria to qualify as a refugee or asylum-seeker, nor has Estonia yet endorsed the relevant UN conventions.

The situation caused by not having an official policy towards emigration nor an efficient data recording system leads to another problem, that of temporary residence changes to the West through visas or fictitious traineeships. Some of the temporary emigrants

travelling on visas prolong their stay in the destination countries. Sometimes, having found a job or some other means of subsistence, they stay permanently. In such situations, the registers in the departure countries fail to record the emigration [see also Boubnova 1992].

In the last few years, an increasing number of people have applied for work permits and fellowships in Western countries. Some idea of the magnitude can be obtained on the basis of data from Estonia. In Estonia, the greatest share of these movements is to Finland. Although the information is very scattered, and there is no centralized system of gathering it, until 1991 those wishing work permits or scholarships had to apply through either the Ministry of Labour (work permits) or the Ministry of Education (training, further education). These administrative units covered about half of all the applicants for permits to leave Estonia.

According to data from the Ministry of Labour, 2751 work permits were issued in 1991, among which 2546 were applicants for Finland. At the same time, about 1500 people applied to the Labour Exchange Bureau (in the capital) with the aim of obtaining a job in Western countries. About 400 of those wanted to find permanent living and working arrangements in the neighbouring countries of the former USSR. For those wishing to live or to work in Russia or elsewhere in the former Soviet Union, the Tallinn Labour Exchange Bureau is the only official authority.

The Ministry of Education of Finland has reported about 500 students from Estonia in Finland for the 1991/1992 school year. The Ministry of Education of Estonia has reported that 224 persons have left for further education in Western countries, not counting those applying directly through higher educational institutions. Of those, more than 80 percent have gone to Finland. Others have gone to Sweden, Germany and the USA. About 25 percent are from higher educational institutions. Unfortunately, beginning in 1992, these data were not recorded in Estonia. Thus, since 1992, there is no basis to study these processes.

For Estonia, since the main stream of temporary migrants is to Finland, the problems associated with this movement could be solved on the basis of both countries' agreement on cross-border work permits [Parviainen 1992]. Without relevant data, it is hard to say whether new destination regions (USA, Canada, Australia) are also receiving more temporary migrants from Estonia. It might be useful to launch a special survey on this topic for all three Baltic States. The data could be used to evaluate the trends and possibilities for solving emerging problems through joint-ventures, educational campaigns, and vocational training courses organised in cooperation with Western centers.

3. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

The high level of migration into the Baltic region since 1945 has led to a large foreign-born population in the Baltic States to the present time. For the whole Soviet Union, migrations with Western countries formed an insignificant share in all migrations (less

than one person per thousand); the foreign-born population in the Baltic States is formed by migration between the Baltic States and the remainder of the former Soviet Union.

The development of migration processes in Estonia and Latvia is very different from that in the other republics of the former Soviet Union. This is because the stage of demographic development of these two countries was very different from that in the rest of the USSR at the time of the annexation of Baltic States by the USSR. Estonia and Latvia continued to be similar to Western Europe in the mobility development of their native populations. However, expansive Soviet economic policy, along with Soviet administrative regulations, made Estonia and Latvia enormous labour-consuming regions, with the labour coming from elsewhere in the Soviet Union. Fifty years of Soviet rule left these two countries with the highest share of foreign-born population in Europe and with all of the accompanying problems.

The foreign-born population, whether naturalized citizens or not, is receiving increasing attention in most European countries, since the social needs and culture of foreigners usually differ from those of the native-born population. Special projects carried out under the auspices of the Council of Europe (including COST activities on East-West Brain Drain), the United Nations (ECE PAU International Migration Project) and the authorities of individual countries demonstrate the need to investigate the problems caused by intensive international migration [Sadik 1992; Rhode 1991; Chesnais 1991; Van de Kaa 1991].

The high level of migration into the Baltic States in the past has lead to special characteristics of the current situation. Many immigrants entered the Baltic States not for permanent residence but for a short-term stay. This is especially true for families of army officers and young people responding to the special calls for manpower, typical in economic branches supervised directly by Moscow. In the past, these migrants would have left the Baltic republics after a stay of a few years. Now, many of these people are reluctant to leave the Baltic States due to increasing social disorganization elsewhere in the former Soviet Union. The biggest difficulties could be expected with the population originating from regions with no historical or cultural contacts with the Baltic States, especially those immigrants who reside in cities in which a majority of the population is comprised of immigrants.

In Estonia (to a lesser extent for the other Baltic countries) two aspects of the situation are unusual and need to be kept in mind. (1) The foreign-born and first generation native-born population comprises a very large proportion of the current total population of Estonia, nearly the largest in Europe. In some cities they are the majority. (2) In general, the difference between their needs and the needs of the native population were ignored by Soviet ideology, which was concerned with the unified characteristics of "new people of the communist era".

In most respects, the unified social organization practiced in Soviet Union has been more acceptable for the immigrants than for the local population (especially due to the selective nature of the immigrants). Some recent social changes are viewed by the foreign-born population as a special attack on their rights in Estonia or in other Baltic countries, even when the same changes are going on in all the regions of the previous Soviet Union.

Moreover, World War II and associated changes in the geopolitical situation greatly increased immigration into Estonia and Latvia, to a lesser extent into Lithuania from the East. In the first post-war decade, administatively supervized migration was directed to the Baltic region for political and ideological purposes. The Baltic countries received also a great number of military personnel, army officers usually accompanied by their families. At the same time, a large-scale deportation of members of the local population to Siberia was carried out.

The second most important implication of the extensive immigration into the Baltic region, which is especially relevant to Estonia, is the sharp changes in the ethnic and language environment. An ethnically and culturally homogeneous country has changed to a country of international cities. Taking into consideration the loss of the historical ethnic minorities (the departure of Germans in 1939-1940 and of Swedes in 1944, the territories of mixed Estonian-Russian population united with the Russian Republic in 1945) Estonia was ethnically very homogeneous after World War II: 97.3 percent of the total population were Estonians according to the boundaries of 1945; members of all other ethnic groups spoke the Estonian language. The situation was rather different in Latvia and Lithuania, where the titular nationalities formed only about 80 percent in each country.

3.1. Future trends of migration

The future of the Estonian and Latvian population will be substantially determined by the future course of the titular nationality and other ethnic groups, especially Russians, in each country. These two communities each are following their own path of development in many respects. This heterogeneity must be taken into account when dealing with the possible migration behaviour. It seems likely that migration processes will become the most important factor influencing the formation of the population of the Baltic States in the 21st century.

The primary problem concerns post-war immigrants to the Baltic States, particularly the foreign-born population, but to some extent the non-titular nationalities in general. However, the non-titular nationalities are comprised of several distinctive groups.

A first group consists of members of communities which have long been in a Baltic State and individuals who have resided in a Baltic State for many decades. These people are well-adapted to the local culture and are likely to stay in their current country of residence. In Estonia this group forms no more than 15-20 percent of the present non-Estonian population.

Another group of immigrants, which includes Soviet army officers with their families and Communist Party administrators, would prefer to leave the Baltic States. This group is even less numerous than the previous group.

Approximately three-fourths of the non-native population are confronting different alternatives. The Baltic States are not the homeland for the typical immigrant. They live

in cities and work in areas of the economy that are not well integrated with the economy as a whole. Their knowledge of the local culture and language is poor, and most of their relatives live abroad. In short, their homeland is somewhere else in the former Soviet Union, not in the Baltic State in which they now reside.

However, once they had come to the Soviet West (as the Baltic States have sometimes been referred to in these circles) they had no strong motivation to go back to their place of origin. The economic difficulties in the previous Soviet Union discouraged reemigration. At the same time, some of the immigrants would gladly leave the Baltic States for the 'real' West. Many of them would prefer to live in the USA, Germany, or Finland, but would also be willing to go to Argentina, for example. The migration policy of the developed countries would determine the scale of out-migration of this group.

The dynamics of migration processes suggests that the potential for emigration is different among the native population and the immigrant population. The Parent-Youth Socialization Survey conducted by the Institute of Philosophy, Law and Sociology of Estonia in 1991 throws some light on the intentions of the two different sub-groups of the population [Anderson, Silver, Titma 1991]. Among both sub-populations, only about 10 percent of respondents had any intention to migrate. Among the Estonians intending to migrate, 90 percent intended to move somewhere in Estonia, whereas about 60 percent of non-Estonians intened to migrate elsewhere in the previous Soviet Union. A greater degree of differentiation appeared in emigration intentions to Western countries: among Estonians they comprised 3 percent, whereas among non-Estonians they comprised 28 percent.

A portion of the native populations also intends to leave. The current differences in the standard of living between the Baltic States and Western Europe are too large to totally avoid out-migration. Nevertheless, currently the native populations would probably try to get a temporary job in Western countries rather than change their place of residence permanently.

Thus, the main concern with international migration for the native populations is short-term job-oriented migration, whereas for other ethnic groups the main concern is permanent emigration. Regarding the latter, although members of Slavic ethnic groups still have a lot of emigration potential, groups such as Jews, Germans, Poles and Finns have largely exhausted their emigration potential. For that reason, one can already observe a decline in the crude migration rates of the latter groups.

To summarize the above speculations, Estonia will probably lose 20-30 percent of its present population because of out-migration. This could occur only if Western countries are quite liberal about accepting immigrants [Söderling 1991; Iloniemi 1992]. A large part of the out-migration flow could be directed to Russia if housing were available there. The latter would be positively met also by Russian authorities [Maslov and Osinski 1992]. In current economic circumstancies, the creation of such an alternative also depends heavily on Western policies.

It is also possible that immigration to the Baltic States, especially Estonia, from the rest of the former Soviet Union will continue. A large part of this contingent would be relatives of the current immigrants in the Baltics. By a very rough estimation, about 1.0-

1.5 million relatives of immigrants to Estonia now live elsewhere in the previous Soviet Union [Katus and Sakkeus 1992]. This number is nearly the same as the current population of Estonia.

The immigration intentions of the relatives of the current immigrant population would depend on the relative economic development of the Baltic States and the other countries of the former Soviet Union. The possibilities to use the Baltic States as a springboard for out-migration to the West also must be taken into consideration in judging the future of immigration.

The two possible migration futures outlined above are partly mutually exclusive. If large-scale out-migration of the non-native population takes place from the Baltic States, few relatives from elsewhere in the former Soviet Union could immigrate in the future. And, vice versa, the lesser the out-migration in the near future, the higher the probability of continued in-migration to the Baltic States in the future.

The migration relations within the Baltic region have been insignificant throughout the post-war period. The reasons in each case are different. Estonia's migration relationships with Latvia are not intensive, because both are at the same stage of mobility transition with no migration potential. There is a different explanation for Lithuania. Lithuania is at the same stage of the mobility transition as Byelorussia. Lithuania was not able to compete outside its boundaries with such large countries as Russia and Ukraine, so Lithuania's migration potential was realized within its own region - although, there was some migration from Lithuania to Latvia.

Negative net migration occurred in all three Baltic countries in 1991 and continued during 1992, according to official data on residence permits. However, the number of illegal immigrants seems to have increased greatly, judging from Estonian data as well as the increase in the number of applicants for refugee status in these countries. Thus, the Baltic States may actually still be experiencing positive net in-migration, if illegal migrants are counted.

3.2. Organization of migration statistics.

The Baltic States are having a transition period in data collection and methods of estimating migration statistics. A person is recorded for migration statistics (immigration, emigration) after registering at the place of residence. This is a remnant from Soviet times which is not completely enforced. This lack of enforcement has led to underestimation of the number of people actually residing in the Baltic States. This underrecording involves all directions of migration: internal, with the rest of the former Soviet Union, and with other countries of the world. The greatest underrecording is for migrations with other parts of the former Soviet Union.

The problem lies mainly in the condition of state statistics departments. From Soviet times they acted as mediators of aggregated data following all-union Soviet methodology. In the all-union system, the Baltic republics were regarded as provinces.

Thus, data collection from the Baltic region was subordinated to all-union needs. Newly gained independence has left Baltic statistical institutions in a situation in which the methodology of the former USSR is of no help and the local staff has not yet gained sufficient knowledge of internationally comparable methodology. Unfortunately, so far, the legal status of the statistical institutions has not helped their possibilities for contributing to the collection and analysis of data for social planning. Cooperation in projects carried out in Europe could be very helpful to the Baltic States. It would be especially relevant to join with the International Migration Project which is carried out under the auspices of the Economic Commission for Europe (PAU). Fortunately, the economic situation in these newly independent countries is favorable to carrying out such surveys when relevant data are lacking.

3.3. Conclusions

The very high proportion of the adult population which is foreign-born must be taken into account when analysis is done of labour force participation in different economic branches, of living conditions and, of likely future out-migration from the Baltic States.

The differentiation of the population of these states was not mainly due to ethnic origin. The main cause was the historically different demographic development of various parts of the former Soviet Union, with corresponding different cultural background of members of ethnic groups from different regions. The coexistence of the two factors must be also taken into consideration when dealing with social processes in a wider context. The origin of the push-factors in the region is the organization of the state socialist system, common to all newly independent states in the dissolved Soviet Union.

The main focus of study of attention on future migratory movements of the Baltic States should be the behaviour of the foreign-born population, most of whom are members of Slavic ethnic groups. The work of various researchers [van de Kaa 1991; Vishnevsky and Zayonchkovskaya 1992] makes it clear that there are limits to the amount of migration based primarily on ethnic group membership. The migration potential of members of the titular nationalities, especially in Estonia and Latvia, is going to result mainly in moves for specialized education or temporary work. As the differences in educational and work opportunities diminish, migration should become similar to the migration exchange between Western countries.

The migration potential of members of Slavic ethnic groups depends very much on bilateral or multilateral agreements between the states involved. Economically, much could be done through joint-ventures in the regions interested in gaining back members of their population who emigrated earlier. For the Baltic region these are, for instance, Pihkva (Pskov) and Novgorod regions in Russia, Vitebsk in Belorussia and the well-known depopulated non-Chernozem (non-Blacksoil) area of the previous Soviet Union. West-oriented groups are more interested in making contacts with regions that have a more liberal immigration policy, such as the South American countries, Australia, and South Africa.

It is important now for the Baltic States to develop a data recording system which covers all international moves, since the system that exists from the Soviet period does not cover all such moves in the region and has contributed to growth in the number of illegal immigrants. To cover non-registered moves, it would be very valuable for the Baltic States to cooperate in all-European projects carried out on this topic. The overall understanding of the amount of non-registered moves would benefit from investigation about the categories involved and the main destination regions and could serve as a basis for formulating relevant immigration and emigration policy.

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FIGURE 1 LEVEL OF EXTERNAL IN-MIGRATIONS
BALTIC STATES, 1945-1959
(compared to the first dated year)



FIGURE 2 SHARE OF EXTERNAL MIGRATION
IN TOTAL INMIGRATIONS,
ESTONIA AND LITHUANIA, 1955-1980



FIGURE 3 MIGRATION STREAMS OF ESTONIA
incl. internal and external, 1946-1991



FIGURE 4 NET MIGRATION RATE WITH USSR
BALTIC STATES, 1959-1991



FIGURE 5 CROSS-SECTIONAL MIGRATION
INTENSITY FOR DIFFERENT OUT-STREAMS,
ESTONIA, 1967-1990



FIGURE 6 AGE-SPECIFIC OUT-MIGRATION
RATES, BALTIC STATES, 1989



FIGURE 7 FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION IN SELECTED EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, 1989



FIGURE 8 DISTRIBUTION BY URBAN OR RURAL RESIDENCE AND BY PLACE OF ORIGIN BALTIC STATES, 1989



FIGURE 9 FOREIGN-BORN AND NATIVE-BORN POPULATIONS OF THE NON-ESTONIANS ESTONIA, 1989



FIGURE 10 NON-ESTONIAN POPULATION WITH EDUCATION LOWER SECONDARY
Estonia, 1989



FIGURE 11 KNOWLEDGE OF ESTONIAN AS SECOND LANGUAGE
Estonia, Non-Estonians, 1989



FIGURE 12 CRUDE OUT-MIGRATION RATE
WESTERN COUNTRIES
BALTIC STATES, 1959-1991



APPENDIX

INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION STREAMS OF BALTIC STATES

ESTONIA, 1946–1991

	MIGRATION FLOW IN-MIGRATION		MIGRATION FLOW OUT-MIGRATION		CRUDE MIGRATION RATE OUT-MIGRATION	
YEAR	USSR	OTHERS	USSR	OTHERS	USSR	OTHERS
1946	46455	1509	14489	734		
1947	47498	523	18593	284		
1948	33624	678	21700	254		
1949	31286	339	21647	144		
1950	36289	495	22792	174		
1951	40076	322	26774	175		
1952	37556	461	23526	174		
1953	39323	417	26817	143		
1954	36462	372	25714	331		
1955	30764	765	28659	139		
1956	39084	1387	29060	250		
1957	31911	464	31973	740		
1958	28449	295	21468	394		
1959	24024	380	18779	322	15.66	0.27
1960	23093	264	21514	362	17.76	0.30
1961	22297	335	14339	168	11.70	0.14
1962	22122	165	14693	170	11.83	0.14
1963	21478	251	13417	158	10.66	0.13
1964	22082	263	13092	247	10.25	0.19
1965	21784	269	14342	207	11.08	0.16
1966	22892	220	16487	225	12.60	0.17
1967	21714	189	18093	168	13.72	0.13
1968	27813	198	18269	278	13.72	0.21
1969	31409	527	19936	382	14.80	0.28
1970	30235	694	18956	604	13.91	0.44
1971	28787	496	18698	676	13.55	0.49
1972	25324	217	17492	774	12.54	0.55
1973	26197	237	18272	955	12.98	0.68
1974	24668	335	18744	2684	13.20	1.89
1975	23828	300	18010	2324	12.59	1.62
1976	23488	284	16887	2428	11.72	1.69
1977	24158	342	16005	1637	11.03	1.13
1978	22608	425	16407	864	11.23	0.59
1979	21703	385	16332	857	11.12	0.58
1980	20321	565	14010	863	9.49	0.58
1981	20034	541	13348	642	8.97	0.43
1982	19184	597	13341	736	8.90	0.49
1983	17546	693	12923	710	8.57	0.47
1984	16814	688	12064	690	7.94	0.45
1985	17098	2031	11681	938	7.64	0.61
1986	17349	1112	11352	997	7.37	0.65
1987	16045	829	11205	1386	7.22	0.89
1988	12560	1608	10754	2449	6.89	1.57
1989	11118	1380	9960	2365	6.35	1.51
1990	7554	827	10735	1667	6.83	1.06
1991	4966	237	11544	1693	7.37	1.08

LATVIA, 1960–1991

	MIGRATION FLOW IN-MIGRATION		MIGRATION FLOW OUT-MIGRATION		CRUDE MIGRATION RATE OUT-MIGRATION	
	USSR	OTHERS	USSR	OTHERS	USSR	OTHERS
1960	44343	566	29805	671	14.00	0.32
1961	41072	398	26206	449	12.14	0.21
1962	36003	254	25408	500	11.62	0.23
1963	36983	390	23135	690	10.46	0.31
1964	34020	538	21988	748	9.81	0.33
1965	30401	473	19110	742	8.43	0.33
1966	18806	300	12394	327	5.41	0.14
1967	27961	465	19816	902	8.56	0.39
1968	31783	820	20662	154	8.85	0.07
1969	32123	577	23609	1457	10.03	0.62
1970	33206	722	21475	939	9.05	0.40
1971	38008	920	23409	3447	9.78	1.44
1972	38998	802	24759	3112	10.26	1.29
1973	40953	760	26362	2075	10.83	0.85
1974	40255	888	26472	1781	10.79	0.73
1975	39472	975	27433	2126	11.09	0.86
1976	37356	909	25238	2069	10.14	0.83
1977	39465	1200	27095	2102	10.83	0.84
1978	36649	1291	26811	2267	10.66	0.90
1979	34735	1522	27951	3840	11.07	1.52
1980	32601	1417	26867	2323	10.60	0.92
1981	33017	1548	26186	1265	10.29	0.50
1982	32913	1385	24310	1215	9.49	0.47
1983	31472	1747	24577	1615	9.53	0.63
1984	32789	1849	24086	1534	9.28	0.59
1985	32835	1765	21941	1570	8.40	0.60
1986	36399	1940	24400	1484	9.26	0.56
1987	36904	2332	24328	1783	9.14	0.67
1988	32232	2089	24739	2261	9.26	0.85
1989	18561	2307	22886	3423	8.57	1.28
1990	14881	2135	20852	4557	7.81	1.71
1991	10809	1828	21205	2597	7.96	0.98

LITHUANIA, 1959–1991

	MIGRATION FLOW IN-MIGRATION		MIGRATION FLOW OUT-MIGRATION		CRUDE MIGRATION RATE OUT-MIGRATION	
	USSR	OTHERS	USSR	OTHERS	USSR	OTHERS
1959	45024		28843		10.55	
1960	39565		29955		10.78	
1961	32499		25322		8.97	
1962	30271		28854		10.08	
1963	29882		26508		9.14	
1964	30653		24329		8.29	
1965	33999		24182		8.14	
1966	23715	595	13767	1123	4.58	0.37
1967	22940	461	15556	989	5.11	0.32
1968	22136	376	15350	441	4.99	0.14
1969	25517	379	16015	1106	5.15	0.36
1970	24514	638	15805	752	5.02	0.24
1971	24972	625	16075	3729	5.05	1.17
1972	24033	671	15712	4291	4.88	1.33
1973	23215	559	15539	2295	4.78	0.71
1974	23408	723	15665	1347	4.78	0.41
1975	22636	798	15158	1756	4.58	0.53
1976	22316	712	14857	998	4.45	0.30
1977	22234	664	15582	1017	4.64	0.30
1978	21683	745	15863	1357	4.68	0.40
1979	21747	706	15404	1944	4.52	0.57
1980	21097	996	15385	1690	4.48	0.49
1981	21369	751	16612	1109	4.80	0.32
1982	20697	893	14520	874	4.16	0.25
1983	21777	951	14906	880	4.23	0.25
1984	20683	890	14345	843	4.04	0.24
1985	21468	1036	14433	672	4.02	0.19
1986	22948	1131	14997	862	4.14	0.24
1987	22464	1337	14534	1337	3.98	0.37
1988	21899	1361	14855	1259	4.04	0.34
1989	16755	2156	15439	2198	4.17	0.59
1990	13197	1547	19827	3765	5.33	1.01
1991	10709	1119	18085	2618	4.83	0.70